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I. Introduction 
A financial aid regime that requires students to shoulder 
ever more of the cost of higher education represents a decision to 
treat education more like a consumer investment. Access to credit 
enables students to meet the rising costs of college; students 
borrow through federal aid programs and from private lenders. 
Yet determining the extent to which federal student loans should 
resemble loans in other contexts is a difficult task. It is also a 
necessary and important one, and thoughtful proposals that take 
it on should be welcomed and carefully considered. Michael 
Simkovic’s recent Article in these pages is at once a sophisticated, 
constructive, and provocative contribution to ongoing debates 
over how to pay for college. 
In Risk-Based Student Loans,1 Professor Simkovic addresses 
the terms of student loans and proposes setting interest rates on 
federal student loans2 based on the likelihood of repayment: the 
less likely a student is to have a job paying enough to cover 
repayment obligations, the higher the interest rate that the 
student should be required to pay.3 Such loan pricing, used in 
some other credit markets, imposes a higher cost of borrowing on 
those who are determined to be more likely to default than those 
                                                                                                     
 1. Michael Simkovic, Risk-Based Student Loans, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
527 (2013).  
 2. Throughout this Article, the focus is federal student loans.  
 3. See Simkovic, supra note 1, at 590–91 (explaining the theory of risk-
based credit pricing). 
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who are less likely to default, compensating lenders more when 
the risk of losing their money is higher.4 
Professor Simkovic proposes basing federal student loan 
interest rates on student choices of major.5 The proposal would 
impose higher interest rates on loans to students who pursue 
majors in which past graduates have tended to default on their 
federal loans at relatively high rates.6 The proposal would charge 
a lower interest rate to students who pursue majors in which past 
graduates have defaulted at relatively low rates. While the 
current system of fixed-rate7 federal loans requires a rational, 
prospective student borrower to bet that a particular choice of 
college, major, and career will enable repayment, Professor 
Simkovic’s proposal raises the stakes by imposing a higher 
interest rate on borrowers who choose majors associated with 
higher rates of default.8  
The problem that the proposal would solve, Professor 
Simkovic writes, “is a large mismatch between the skills workers 
have and employers’ needs . . . [which] contributes to structural 
unemployment, reduced output, and student loan defaults.”9 Too 
many students, he suggests, are pursuing courses of study that 
do not prepare them for employment, let alone particularly 
                                                                                                     
 4. See id. at 589 (“Risk-based credit pricing involves adjusting the interest 
rate on loans so that the interest rate compensates the lender not only for the 
time value of money, but also for the risk that borrowers will default on their 
debts . . . .”). 
 5. Id. at 625–26. Professor Simkovic also suggests that other borrower 
characteristics, such as “class rank, standardized test scores, geographic 
location, type of school attended, [or] expected debt-to-income ratios at 
graduation,” could play a role in setting interest rates. Id. at 596. 
 6. See id. at 625 (stating that risk-based pricing would encourage college 
students to choose majors and courses “that would better prepare them for post-
graduation employment opportunities” and reduce student loan default rates). 
 7. Actually, Congress in 2013 approved basing rates on the government’s 
cost of funds. Jeremy W. Peters, Senate Approves College Student Loan Plan 
Tying Rates to Markets, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2013, at A12. Allowing rates to 
adjust in this way does not attempt to accomplish a particular policy goal, as 
Professor Simkovic’s proposal does. 
 8. Id.; see also id. at 571–72 n.117 (discussing scholarship on wage 
differentials and debt-to-income ratios across different majors). 
 9. Id. at 530. 
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lucrative employment.10 Unemployment and lower pay make 
repayment more difficult and default more likely. Labor 
shortages are a result of the failure of the education system to 
function properly: Wage signals do not have the desired effect of 
attracting more labor.11 If the cost of borrowing were higher for 
students choosing college majors that have not led to higher-
paying jobs, he argues, then at least some students would 
respond by changing their major.12 They would find employment 
more quickly, earn higher wages, and manage their debt more 
easily.13 The evidence offered includes data on wages earned by 
graduates with different degrees and unemployment rates for 
recent graduates with different degrees, to argue that the risk of 
student loan default is greater for those students who choose 
certain majors.14 This idea of varying student loan interest rates 
has appealed to others in recent months.15  
In this Article, I argue that pricing of student loans based on 
riskiness of choice of major is a dangerous idea. Such a policy 
move, I argue, will likely not have the desired effect, will have 
undesirable ancillary effects, is probably unnecessary, and is 
                                                                                                     
 10. See id. at 541–42 figs. 2.1, 2.2 (showing graphic material representing 
higher employment rates at graduation and increased earning potential for 
certain majors over others).  
 11. See id. at 583–84 (describing students’ possible failures to understand 
or anticipate correctly the wage and employment prospects associated with 
different fields of study). More recently, evidence has developed that students 
are acting on their perceptions of the value of different courses of study and are 
eschewing the humanities. Tamar Lewin, As Interest Fades in the Humanities, 
Colleges Worry, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2013, at A1. 
 12. See id. at 630 (arguing that risk-based pricing may change behavior if 
only “some proportion of students are motivated at least in part by financial 
incentives”). 
 13. The higher their earnings, the more they would also presumably pay in 
taxes, giving back to the government, as Professor Simkovic points out. Id. at 
532–34. 
 14. See Simkovic, supra note 1, at 540–42 figs. 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 (displaying 
data regarding salary, job offer rate, and median earnings based on major). 
 15. In the realm of legal scholarship, for example, see Peter Zuckerman, 
Note, Ending Student Loan Exceptionalism: The Case for Risk-Based Pricing 
and Dischargeability, 126 HARV. L. REV. 587, 588 (2012). In the realm of online 
punditry, for example, see Glenn Reynolds, Should Student Loans Be Priced 
Differently According to Major?, INSTAPUNDIT (May 6, 2012, 8:05 AM), 
http://pjmedia.com/instapundit/142233/ (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
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inconsistent with the values animating decades of federal student 
aid policy. 
The discussion has four parts, each developing one of these 
arguments. In Part II, I argue that higher interest rates are 
unlikely to steer students away from particular majors because 
students may not respond to such price signals. In the same Part, 
I then identify potential ill-effects, such as raising the repayment 
burden for those students who pursue majors associated with 
higher rates of default because they plan to enter lower-wage 
careers, and describe superior alternatives for encouraging 
particular courses of study. In Part III, I suggest that the 
problem justifying the proposal is overstated; even if there is a 
gap between the needs of employers generally and the skills in 
the workforce generally, it is simply not clear that choices of 
major by college graduates play a significant or relevant role. In 
Part IV, I argue that Professor Simkovic’s approach to higher 
education finance runs counter to that historically adopted by 
lawmakers, who have endorsed the importance of the freedom to 
choose what to study and, ultimately, what to do with one’s life. 
Part V concludes. 
II. Of Uncertain Efficacy and Undesirable Effects 
Scholarship analyzing the effects of different kinds of 
incentives on human behavior has burgeoned in recent years. 
Behavioral economists and law professors adopting their methods 
have documented the efficacy of “nudges” to encourage people to 
act in a particular way, in accord with a particular policy 
objective or normative view. For example, more workers may put 
aside a portion of their wages for retirement if employers 
automatically deposit a portion of employee earnings in a 
retirement account rather than doing so only if an employee 
affirmatively request such deposits.16 A small change in policy 
structure results in a significant change in behavior. An 
evaluation of Professor Simkovic’s proposal must ask the 
following question: will pricing of student loans based on student 
                                                                                                     
 16. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS 110–11 (2009). 
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choice of course of study—what he calls risk-based pricing—
nudge students to make different choices? 
In this Part, I warn that variable pricing of student loans is 
unlikely to affect behavior. I then describe the negative effects 
such loan pricing would have. I note that it would be very difficult 
to predict future employment prospects for different majors in 
order to set interest rates, and voice concern that some indicators 
of propensity to default may disproportionately and adversely 
affect borrowers who have historically enjoyed less access to 
higher education. I also argue that if we do wish to redirect 
students to particular fields, there exist more effective ways of 
doing so than through the setting of interest rates. 
A. Changes in Interest Rates May Not Affect Borrower Behavior 
If students already do not respond to higher wages paid to 
graduates who major in particular fields—part of the problem 
Professor Simkovic sets out to resolve17—it is difficult to see why 
they would respond to interest rates on their student loans. 
Professor Simkovic notes that the “empirical literature on 
whether borrowers react rationally to interest rates is somewhat 
mixed.”18 He cites research showing that borrowers make 
mistakes when weighing interest rates against lender-imposed 
fees; that some consumers use payday loans even when cheaper 
borrowing options are available; that some consumers exhibit 
poor comprehension of the significance of interest rates overall; 
and that credit card users react to changes in interest rates over 
time.19 However, he observes that much of the scholarship 
addressing the incentive effects of interest rates has focused on 
subprime borrowers, who may or may not be more sophisticated 
than college students.20  
                                                                                                     
 17. Simkovic, supra note 1, at 586 (arguing that “risk-based pricing of 
student loans could help make wages and employment prospects more 
transparent and salient to students”). But see also Lewin, supra note 11 
(describing recent evidence that students are responding to wage signals, 
obviating the need to adopt Professor Simkovic’s variable interest rate scheme). 
 18. Simkovic, supra note 1, at 629 n.281. 
 19. Id.  
 20. Id. 
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Studies of overall borrower comprehension of the terms of 
various kinds of credit have also suggested that consumers are 
“imperfectly informed.”21 Significantly, one study of the financial 
literacy of young people in particular found wide variability in 
capacity to understand basic concepts, including interest rates; 
the authors concluded that the level of sophistication was 
“dangerously low.”22 Other research has found that some 
borrowers consistently pay more than other, similarly situated 
borrowers,23 and this may be evidence of differing levels of ability 
or desire to review loan terms carefully.24 
Experts looking at consumer evaluation of offers of credit 
have attempted to identify the circumstances under which 
                                                                                                     
 21. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1, 30 (2008). 
 22. Annamaria Lusardi, Olivia S. Mitchell & Vilsa Curto, Financial 
Literacy among the Young: Evidence and Implications for Consumer Policy, 44 J. 
CONSUMER AFFAIRS 358, 375 (2010), http://www.council foreconed.org/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2011/11/Financial-Literacy-for-Young-Lusardi.pdf. The study 
also found that children of parents who were more engaged in investing were 
more financially literate, suggesting that changes to student loan interest rates 
might have a regressive effect, resulting in worse loan terms for those with less 
educated or less wealthy parents. See id. (noting education attainment of 
parents had some effect, too, on the financial literacy of the young people 
surveyed). 
 23. See Jeff Sovern, Preventing Future Economic Crises through Consumer 
Protection Law or How the Truth in Lending Act Failed the Subprime 
Borrowers, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 763, 788 (2010) (describing one study that found 
that younger adults and older adults pay higher interest rates and higher fees 
than do middle-aged adults and another that found that holders of bachelor’s 
degrees paid brokers less than customers without them). 
 24. This is an area in which experimentation could prove fruitful. Rather 
than adjusting interest rates, students could be provided with information on 
the likely implications of choice of major on income and employment. 
Payscale.com ranks colleges and universities based on graduates’ earnings. 
James B. Stewart, New Metric for Colleges: Graduates’ Salaries, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 14, 2013, at B1. Some number of students might pay attention to such 
disclosure. Professor Simkovic cites a study that found 7.5% of students 
surveyed would have chosen differently had they known more about their likely 
future wages. See Simkovic, supra note 1, at 584 n.136 (citing a study that found 
that “over 7.5% of students would switch majors if this forecast error was not 
present” (citation omitted)). Simply telling students about their likely future 
wages is preferable to charging them different interest rates based on choice of 
major because disclosure alone does not increase the risk of default for students 
who do not read, understand, or choose to pay attention to the information 
provided. 
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disclosures of loan terms help potential borrowers do a better job 
of weighing costs: 
• The consumer has the opportunity to read the 
disclosures fully; 
• The disclosures are unambiguous and understandable; 
• The disclosures are true and apply to the entire term 
of the contract; 
• The consumer has the knowledge and sophistication 
to understand the meaning of the information 
provided in the disclosures; 
• The consumer has the opportunity to make choices 
based on the information gained through the 
disclosures.25 
Students do receive information on loan terms at origination, and 
the federal government has attempted to improve students’ 
ability to understand what is disclosed and to compare financial 
aid packages offered by colleges.26  
Students may not read the terms of the loans they use to pay 
for higher education. Some students, perhaps many of them, may 
believe that whatever the aggregate data on wages in a particular 
                                                                                                     
 25. Examining the Billing, Marketing, and Disclosure Practices of the 
Credit Card Industry, and their Impact on Consumers: Hearing Before the H. 
Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
110th Cong. 21 (2009) (statement of Michael D. Donovan, Partner, Donovan 
Searles, LLC), http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Donovan090505.pdf. 
 26. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has produced a “financial 
aid shopping sheet” to assist student borrowers to understand and compare 
financial aid packages. See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Press Release, 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and Department of Education Partner on 
New Financial Aid Shopping Sheet (Oct. 25, 2011), available at 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/pressreleases/consumer-financial-protection-bu 
reau-and-department-of-education-partner-on-new-financial-aid-shopping-sheet/ 
(explaining how the financial aid shopping sheet may help students) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). But when it comes to federal 
student loans, borrowers have no experience comparison shopping because the 
terms are uniform; there has existed no reason to compare loan terms. Professor 
Sovern’s research suggests that inexperience with comparison shopping may 
mean that borrowers “lack the experience needed to make sense of loan terms.” 
Sovern, supra note 23, at 784. Some students are savvy shoppers when 
comparing college pricing but others are not—and shoppers who are not savvy 
will not respond to interest rates or information on future wages. Pricing of 
student loans based on choice of major could well penalize the unsophisticated 
higher education consumer, who might be first in family to attend college, for 
example.  
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career, they will revolutionize that field and reap outsize 
rewards. It may be that students feel a calling to pursue a 
particular path regardless of the cost.27 It would help to know 
more than we do about how students make career choices.28 A few 
studies, as Professor Simkovic notes, have found that expected 
                                                                                                     
 27. One study of students’ choices of major found that significant premiums 
to natural science and business majors do not explain the sorting of students 
across majors and concludes that “virtually all sorting is occurring because of 
differing preferences across abilities for majors either in school or for the jobs 
associated with those majors in the workplace.” Peter Arcidiacono, Ability 
Sorting and the Returns to College Major, 121 J. ECONOMETRICS 343, 374 (2004). 
This suggests that students choose majors based on preferences rather than 
wages, and while the preferences of some students may take into account wages, 
those of others may not. If wages do not affect choice, it is hard to see how 
interest rates might. 
 28. Professor Simkovic describes a study of slightly fewer than 600 
students that found that expected earnings played a statistically significant role 
in affecting students’ choices of major. Simkovic, supra note 1, at 585 n.142 
(citing Claude Montmarquette, Kathy Cannings & Sophie Mahseredjian, How 
Do Young People Choose College Majors?, 21 ECON. EDUC. REV. 543, 554 (2002)). 
The study, which implied that better information on wages could be significant 
to students, also found that other factors appeared to play a role. The study did 
not explore the accuracy of student expectations of earnings or the actual salary 
outcomes experienced by the students upon graduation. The effect of expected 
income was greater for men than for women, and greater for students who were 
members of minority groups than for white students. Claude Montmarquette, 
Kathy Cannings & Sophie Mahseredjian, How Do Young People Choose College 
Majors?, 21 ECON. EDUC. REV. 543, 553–54 (2002). The sample for this study 
consisted of 562 people. Id. at 547. Another study, based on a survey of about 
150 Duke University undergraduate, male students, concluded that 7.5% of the 
students would have chosen another major if they had received more accurate 
information about post-graduation wages. Peter Arcidiacono, V. Joseph Hotz & 
Songman Kang, Modeling College Major Choices Using Elicited Measures of 
Expectations and Counterfactuals 22 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper 15729, 2010), available at http://www.nber.org/ papers/w15729. The study 
may suggest that the vast majority of students would not change majors. Id. 
Another study suggests that the 7.5% figure may be high among all 
undergraduates because it included only men; an investigation of differences in 
the choices made by undergraduate male students and undergraduate female 
students found that expected incomes mattered more for men than for women, 
implying that varying interest rates by major may have unintended side-effects 
on who chooses to do what. See Basit Zafar, College Major Choice and the 
Gender Gap 28 (Fed. Reserve Bank of New York, Staff Report No. 364, 2009), 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr364.pdf (explaining the 
results of a study regarding choice of major that found that “females mostly care 
about non-pecuniary outcomes” relative to men).  
2146 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2137 (2013) 
earnings are a significant factor in student choices,29 implying 
that reliable information about future earnings may be a simple 
and low-risk way to encourage students to pursue particular 
courses of study and that adjusting interest rates is unnecessary. 
Potential “mismatch” between student choice of major and labor 
market need may be the result of incorrect information, lack of 
information, or a system maximizing subjective and/or intangible 
values. If information is the problem, though, adjusting interest 
rates may not be the solution. Such a subtle signal may reward 
the more financially savvy student and hurt the less 
sophisticated consumer of higher education, who is more likely to 
be middle class or poor,30 the kind of student that defenders of 
federal aid programs seek to enable to attend college.31 For this 
reason, in addition to the other concerns about efficacy given 
above, attempting to affect students’ decisions through interest 
rates could be dangerously counterproductive. 
B. Rather than Deterring Borrowers, Higher Interest Rates May 
Drive Up Rates of Default 
While differences in interest rates may not have the intended 
effect of redirecting students toward career paths that labor 
markets value most highly, they may have negative effects on 
                                                                                                     
 29. See Montmarquette, Cannings & Mahseredjian, supra note 28, at 554 
(discussing the factors students consider when choosing a college major); 
Arcidiacono, Hotz & Kang, supra note 28, at 22 (explaining that expected 
earnings, among other factors, play a significant role in choice of major); 
Richard J. Cebula & Jerry Lopes, Determinants of Student Choice of 
Undergraduate Major Field, 19 AM. EDUC. RESEARCH J. 303, 309–10 (1982) 
(noting the variables that contribute to a student’s selection of a major). If 
information on wages does not affect student choices, despite what these studies 
have found, it is not clear why differences in interest rates would.  
 30. See Lusardi, Mitchell & Curto, supra note 22, at 375 (noting that 
financial literacy is higher in those whose families invested or saved money). 
 31. President Obama, arguing for better disclosure of student outcomes at 
colleges and for stronger controls on tuition hikes, noted that the rising price of 
higher education disproportionately hinders access to poorer students. Michael 
D. Shear & Tamar Lewin, On Bus Tour, Obama Seeks to Shame Colleges into 
Easing Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2013, at A18. “We can’t price the middle class 
and everybody working to get into the middle class out of college,” the president 
told students at the University at Buffalo, part of the State University of New 
York. Id. 
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students who incur higher interest rates and end up in lower-
paying jobs. Higher interest rates in and of themselves could 
increase the likelihood of default because they make repayment 
more costly. Studies have found that the likelihood of default goes 
up, the more a student borrows and the higher the monthly 
payment a student must make. Higher interest rates increase 
borrowers’ monthly payments.32 Consequently, policies that make 
borrowers’ burdens heavier increase the likelihood of default for 
affected borrowers.33 
This is a critical problem with the proposal to base interest 
rates on choice of major: endogeneity. Raising the interest rate on 
loans to students who decide to major in comparative literature, 
for example, or some other field not associated with earning a 
high income, increases the probability of default by those 
students.34 The higher interest rate in itself will increase the 
probability of default by increasing the repayment burden; the 
bad outcome is more likely to occur because the higher rate has a 
negative effect. The prediction of default becomes self-fulfilling 
while the counterfactual, whether the student would have 
defaulted in the absence of the higher, penalty rate, can never be 
known.35 
The burden of varied interest rates is yet higher for those 
students who choose majors that carry the higher interest rates, 
and who then drop out. Failure to complete a program of study is 
already a powerful predictor of default, as Professor Simkovic 
                                                                                                     
 32. See Jacob P.K. Gross, Osman Cekic, Don Hossler & Nick Hillman, What 
Matters in Student Loan Default: A Review of the Research Literature, 39 J. 
STUDENT FIN. AID 19, 24 (2009) (“Research suggests that as debt burden 
increases so does the likelihood of default.”). I have been unable to find a study 
that looked for a relationship between federal student loan interest rates and 
rates of default on the loans, perhaps because the rates on the loans have 
generally been fixed.  
 33. See id. (discussing how debt burden affects the likelihood of default). 
 34. See id. at 23–24 (explaining that many students default because their 
income is inadequate to make their loan payments).  
 35. To be clear, this does not and is not intended to take away from 
Professor Simkovic’s point that past default rates among graduates with specific 
majors may help predict future default rates in those majors. But it does 
emphasize that higher interest rates may increase the default rate in those 
majors. 
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notes,36 but under his proposed regime, those students would 
bear an even heavier burden than they already do. The cost of the 
penalty imposed on dropouts must be taken into account in 
evaluating whether variable pricing of loans based on major is a 
worthwhile policy. 
For multiple reasons, then, using interest rates to try to 
affect student choice of major is dangerous. First, neither 
disclosure of future wages nor imposition of varied interest rates 
may affect student choice.37 Second, students who choose what to 
study based on factors other than interest rates or prospective 
wages may find themselves facing a relatively high cost of debt, 
increasing the risk of default.38 If interest rates do not affect 
students’ decisions, then higher rates for those who choose 
courses of study associated with lower-pay career paths are more 
likely to default simply because of the terms of their loans.39 The 
differences in interest rates may not only fail to achieve the 
desired outcome, they may worsen the financial situation of 
students who, for whatever reason, do not choose their majors 
based on the cost of credit or on anticipated income. 
                                                                                                     
 36. See Simkovic, supra note 1, at 616 (discussing evidence that those who 
do not complete a four-year degree are often in a worse financial position than 
those who never attended college). 
 37. Professor Simkovic notes that not all students need to respond to better 
information, or to the differential interest rates; as long as some do, that shift is 
an improvement. Id. at 630. However, the cost of defaults that might not have 
happened if interest rates were not higher for other borrowers must be taken 
into account, too.  
 38. Students pursuing majors in which graduates were relatively more 
likely to default in the past would face an incrementally greater risk of default 
under Professor Simkovic’s regime. The higher interest rate would augment the 
effect of lower wages, longer period of unemployment or whatever other factor 
already had increased the likelihood of default. See id. at 602–06 (discussing 
inherent problems in predicting a career’s future earnings). 
 39. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text (explaining why the 
greater the debt burden, the greater the risk of default). 
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C. Predicting Student Outcomes Is Difficult and the Attempt May 
Result in Unfairness 
One goal of Professor Simkovic’s proposal is directing 
graduates into fields that are more likely to pay well.40 But 
accurate prediction of future salaries presents significant 
challenges. The duration of the student’s schooling creates a 
problem because the lender must predict, based on current 
salaries in various fields, what workers will earn years in the 
future.41 In the intervening time, salaries may well change, not 
least because high-wage careers may draw more people into 
them, depressing pay before a current student has the 
opportunity to enter the labor force.42 Professor Simkovic 
describes this as a “cobweb cycle”: If students make decisions 
about careers to pursue based on the current wages in those 
fields, then labor markets experience booms and busts as a result 
of a “production lag” for development of skilled labor.43  
At the start of the cycle, many students seek to study toward a 
high-income occupation. Years later, when they all 
simultaneously try to enter the labor force, the large supply of 
labor causes wages to crash in their occupation. In the second 
stage of the cycle, students choosing an occupation at the time 
of the crash then avoid training for the newly low income 
occupation, and years later, there will be a shortage of labor 
for that occupation, causing wages to rise and the cycle to 
repeat.44 
Perhaps, as Professor Simkovic suggests, sophisticated modeling 
of workforce composition could take into account these boom and 
                                                                                                     
 40. See Simkovic, supra note 1, at 590 (explaining how his plan encourages 
students to study “high-value occupations”). 
 41. See id. (arguing that risk-based loan pricing encourages students “to 
study toward high-value occupations”—a contention that relies on the claim 
that borrowers respond to interest rates, a claim challenged in Part II of this 
Article). Professor Simkovic proposes that the federal Education Department or 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the Department of Labor forecast future wages 
to set interest rates. Id. at 605. 
 42. If students were to respond to information about salaries associated 
with certain choices of undergraduate major by changing their courses of study, 
then this effect could be greater, as more students gravitate toward fields in 
which they expect to earn higher wages. 
 43. Id. at 587. 
 44. Id. 
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bust cycles.45 The lender’s interest rate calculation would 
correspondingly incorporate predictions of the supply of and 
demand for employees with a particular education experience, 
using history as a guide to the future.46 Unfortunately, this 
approach does not resolve the problem and indeed, Professor 
Simkovic acknowledges the role that history-driven predictions 
play in perpetuating cobweb cycles.47 Predicting the most 
lucrative jobs of the future48 requires predicting the future, for 
which the past may not be a very reliable or consistent guide.49 
The future wages paid to graduates with certain majors may be 
affected by the arrival of new types of jobs that do not exist today 
and require skillsets that future entrepreneurs are developing 
right now, on their own, drawing on formal higher education 
experiences in unexpected ways.  
The outcome of a student’s education experience turns on 
myriad factors not captured by choice of major. Psychologists who 
have studied student behavior and education outcomes have 
concluded that students’ beliefs strongly influence their 
attainment: Effort leads to academic success.50 There are various 
theories of what motivates students to work hard to succeed; 
factors affecting expenditure of effort include students’ belief that 
they have the necessary ability and that they can affect the 
                                                                                                     
 45. See id. at 605 (describing how a risk-based pricing model could help the 
labor market adapt to boom and bust cycles). 
 46. See id. (explaining how past trends in the labor market can be used to 
predict the future). 
 47. See id. (observing that students do not have good information about 
future employment and that predictions are difficult, and warning that 
“students[’] app[arent] . . . assum[ption] that the future will resemble the 
present” lead to cobweb cycles). 
 48. The most important indicators of default are employment prospects and 
post-graduation income, Professor Simkovic writes, and that conclusion is most 
likely correct. Id. at 620.  
 49. The more complex the working of the labor market, the greater the 
frequency and significance of low-probability events with far-reaching 
consequences. See NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF 
THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE 61 (2007) (describing the greater vulnerability of highly 
complex systems generally to unlikely events that have powerful consequences). 
 50. See C.S. Dweck & Elaine Elliott, Achievement Motivation, 4 HANDBOOK 
OF CHILD PSYCHOL. 643, 646 (1983) (explaining that a child’s performance is 
linked to “how vigorously” an achievement is pursued). 
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outcome by exerting effort.51 Motivation and effort matter 
because students who are motivated, who are disciplined, who 
correspondingly do well, may prove to be highly successful, 
whatever their field of study in college.52 Such students will be 
lower-risk borrowers, whatever their field of study. 
Some students drop out and found companies that become 
multibillion-dollar enterprises whose products reshape our 
lives.53 Other students major in subjects that might not obviously 
lead to lucrative careers, and then go on to achieve fame and 
wealth nonetheless, either in the chosen field or some other. Yet 
other students might choose to major in subjects that do not lead 
to lucrative careers, but then launch themselves into post-
graduate studies in law or business and put themselves on a 
highly successful path. Most importantly but most difficult to 
measure, some students may choose what to study not in pursuit 
of higher wages but in pursuit of a dream of making a difference 
in the lives of others—perhaps a naïve ambition, perhaps a 
decision that does not maximize personal wealth, but a choice 
that we may want federal aid policy to encourage in the face of 
market incentives to pursue more mercenary life goals.54 The goal 
of higher education finance policy is not the maximization of 
graduates’ income.  
Better predictions of student outcomes might be possible if 
lenders were to take into account more borrower characteristics. 
Professor Simkovic suggests several candidates, including “class 
rank, standardized test scores, geographic location, types of 
school attended, [or] expected debt-to-income ratios at 
graduation.”55 However, there are borrower characteristics that 
                                                                                                     
 51. See Jacquelynne S. Eccles & Allan Wigfield, Motivational Beliefs, 
Values, and Goals, 53 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 109, 110–11 (2002) (listing and 
explaining the theories of motivation focused on expectancy including the self-
efficacy theory and control theories). 
 52. See id. at 122–23 (explaining research that college students’ success is 
tied to effort while their failure correlates to lack of effort). 
 53. Steve Jobs, the late chief executive and visionary of Apple Computer, 
dropped out of Reed College after six months. Steve Jobs, Address at the 
Commencement of Stanford University (June 12, 2005), available at 
http://news.stanford.edu/news/2005/june15/jobs-061505.html. 
 54. On this normative question, see infra notes 114–18 and accompanying 
text (describing lawmakers’ efforts to encourage careers in public service). 
 55. Simkovic, supra note 1, at 596. 
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we as members of our civil society do not want lenders to 
consider, such as race and gender. Professor Simkovic argues that 
lenders should be prohibited from taking into account such 
characteristics,56 even though the race of a borrower, for example, 
correlates with the likelihood of default, as does the income of a 
borrower’s family.57  
Professor Simkovic is correct that the lender should not 
consider a borrower’s race when determining whether that 
borrower is more or less likely to default on a student loan. 
However, I am concerned that even if the federal Department of 
Education serves as the lender, as it currently does for federal 
student loans,58 borrower characteristics that correlate with 
                                                                                                     
 56. Professor Simkovic recognizes the risk of discrimination based on 
borrower characteristics, but suggests that lender consideration of those 
characteristics could be prohibited. Id. at 565 n.98. However, discrimination 
based on various borrower characteristics, such as race, is already prohibited 
and examples nevertheless abound of lender conduct imposing higher costs on 
borrowers who are members of minority groups. See, e.g., Bob Tedesco, 
Safeguarding Against Loan Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2009, at RE6 
(describing a finding that lenders imposed higher costs on home loan borrowers 
who were members of minority groups); see also infra note 59 (describing 
additional allegations of lenders using discriminatory lending practices). One 
virtue of the one-rate-for-all student loan is the elimination of the potential for 
such unfairness. 
 57. See Simkovic, supra note 1, at 624–25 (classifying race and “parents’ 
socio-economic status” as “[t]he most obvious examples of factors that are 
outside the risk of choice and may predict default risk”). Other borrower 
characteristics that are not obviously suspect may correlate with both race and 
risk of default. Use of address information may have the same result as use of 
race itself. A Note outlining a proposal similar to that offered by Professor 
Simkovic suggests that the lender should take into account the “quality of the 
institution attended,” as well as the course of study. Zuckerman, supra note 15, 
at 599. This would reward those students attending the highest quality schools, 
however measured, which tend to enroll fewer students of modest means. Thus, 
considering institutional “quality” would run counter to efforts to promote 
greater socioeconomic diversity of the college-going population. See also supra 
note 56 and accompanying text. A loan pricing regime that rewarded good 
grades might be more defensible than one based on choice of major, if the goal is 
production of a more employable labor force—although even that is questionable 
because rewarding good grades would likely reward and encourage grade 
inflation. 
 58. David M. Herszenhorn & Tamar Lewin, Student Loan Overhaul 
Approved by Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2010, at A16 (reporting on 
Congressional vote to shift entirely to direct lending); see also Jonathan D. 
Glater, The Other Big Test: Why Congress Should Allow College Students to 
Borrow More Through Federal Aid Programs, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 
UNSUPPORTABLE COST 2153 
factors that a lender is formally barred from considering could 
play a role in the calculation of an interest rate.59 Certain majors 
popular with certain populations might experience relatively high 
default rates, for example.60 
Even if, as a policy matter, lender use of less obviously 
suspect borrower characteristics, like income and wealth, is 
permissible in most contexts, perhaps in education finance they 
should be excluded. Government policy seeks to promote access to 
higher education and socioeconomic mobility, as evidenced by the 
establishment of aid programs like Pell Grants, which serve 
                                                                                                     
11, 14 (2011) (noting the changes made to legislation regarding student loans 
and lenders in 2008). 
 59. Quite recently, lenders in other credit markets have paid enormous 
sums to settle allegations that they discriminated against poor and minority 
homebuyers by charging them higher interest rates. These settlements suggest 
that despite threat of criminal enforcement, discriminatory lending practices 
persist. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Wells Fargo Will Settle Mortgage Bias 
Charges, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2012, at B3 (reporting on the $175 million 
settlement resolving federal Department of Justice allegations that “mortgage 
brokers working with Wells Fargo had charged higher fees and rates to more 
than 30,000 minority borrowers across the country than they had to white 
borrowers who posed the same credit risk”); Press Release, Department of 
Justice, Justice Department Reaches $21 Million Settlement to Resolve 
Allegations of Lending Discrimination by Suntrust Mortgage (May 31, 2012), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/12-crt-695.html (announcing 
settlement resolving allegations that SunTrust Mortgage “charg[ed] more than 
20,000 African-American and Hispanic borrowers higher fees and interest rates 
than non-Hispanic white borrowers, not based on borrower risk, but because of 
their race or national origin”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Law Review); 
Press Release, Department of Justice, Justice Department Reaches Lending 
Discrimination Settlement with GFI Mortgage Bankers Inc. (Aug. 28, 2012), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/August/12-crt-1052.html 
(announcing $3.5 million settlement resolving government allegations that 
“interest rates and fees that [the lender] charged on mortgage loans to qualified 
borrowers showed statistically significant disparities between non-Hispanic 
white borrowers and both African-American and Hispanic borrowers that could 
not be explained by objective borrower characteristics or loan product features”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 60. Studies have found that students with different backgrounds tend to 
pursue different courses of study. For example, a study of students’ choice of 
major at three large, public universities in Texas found that white men and 
Asian men are overrepresented among engineering and computer science majors 
while Hispanic women and black women are underrepresented; black women 
are overrepresented in natural and social sciences. See Lisa Dickson, Race and 
Gender Differences in College Major Choice, 627 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. 
SCI. 108, 114 (2010) (describing over and underrepresentation of certain 
ethnicities among various college majors). 
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poorer students.61 It would be counterproductive to set student 
loan terms based on borrower characteristics in a way that 
undermines the policy goals underlying provision of the loans in 
the first place.62 Concern over the high cost of borrowing from a 
private lender, like a commercial bank, prompted federal 
lawmakers’ decision to offer education loans on the same terms to 
all borrowers in the first place.63 
D. There Are Better Ways to Direct Students to Study in 
Particular Areas—If We Want To 
Alternative means exist of directing students to pursue 
specific fields of study. If, as a matter of policy, the allocation of 
human capital is too important to entrust to teenagers, then 
wiser heads should undertake the task.64 If we do have confidence 
                                                                                                     
 61. See Joseph A. Soares, Private Paradigm Constrains Public Response to 
Twenty-First Century Challenges, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 427, 440, 443 (2013) 
(describing how Pell Grant recipients come from families who are “near the 
poverty line” and how Pell Grant funds have more than doubled during the 
Obama administration). 
 62. A growing body of scholarship, some of it within the law, explores 
human reliance on heuristics and highlights the ways in which these mental 
shortcuts may be based on stereotypes and consequently may disadvantage 
members of the stereotyped population. See, e.g., E. Ericka Kelsaw, Help 
Wanted: 23.5 Million Unemployed Americans Need Not Apply, 34 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 45 (2013) (describing dire effects of prospective employers’ 
“stigma against the jobless”). It is possible that in addition to errors generated 
by using the past as a guide to what may be a very different future, a lender will 
rely on presumptions and assumptions about borrower riskiness that may 
reflect judgments that are questionable, because they may be inaccurate, 
because they have counterproductive results, or because they are morally 
offensive. The risk of discriminatory lending would hopefully be mitigated by 
the fact that the lender in federal loan programs is the government. 
 63. See, e.g., 111 Cong. Rec. S22,692 (daily ed. Sept. 2, 1965) (statement of 
Sen. Yarborough) (“[Because] commercial credit is frequently available only at 
high interest rates and must be repaid in the same year. . . , it seems advisable 
to have a program in which loans can be secured at a reasonable rate of interest 
and be paid back over a longer period of time . . . .”). 
 64. It is unclear why only students who borrow—presumably students who 
tend to be less well-off—should be subject to incentives to choose particular 
career paths. See infra subpart III.A. According to the most recent data from the 
Department of Education, 38.5% of undergraduates in 2007–2008 took out some 
type of student loan; 52.9% of undergraduates enrolled full-time did so. Fast 
Facts, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/ 
display.asp?id=31 (last visited Sept. 16, 2013) (on file with the Washington and 
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in the ability of the Department of Education to predict the needs 
of the economy five years into the future, then simply taking 
away a student’s discretion to choose a course of study makes 
sense.65 Exams in the fall of the first year of college could identify 
those with particular skillsets, aptitudes, or areas of knowledge, 
enabling a grand sorting akin to that accomplished by the Sorting 
Hat for young wizards at Hogwarts, the fictional school of 
witchcraft and wizardry in J.K. Rowling’s books.66 Some nations 
do conduct such a sorting; Singapore’s Primary School Leaving 
Examination assesses not only whether students are ready for 
postsecondary education, but for what type of education, from 
express or accelerated to normal academic to technical to 
                                                                                                     
Lee Law Review). The average loan amount was $8,000 for full-time students. 
Id. Other studies, taking into account private loans, have found higher numbers: 
The Institute for College Access & Success’ Project on Student Debt found that 
in 2011, two-thirds of graduates held student loans, and the average total 
amount of debt was $26,600. PROJECT ON STUDENT DEBT, STUDENT DEBT AND THE 
CLASS OF 2011 4 (2012), http://projectonstudentdebt.org/files/pub/classof 
2011.pdf. 
 65. The Department of Education also could disclose to students the wages 
paid in the present, thereby providing students with accurate information. 
President Obama has proposed just such a move. See Shear and Lewin, supra 
note 31. In other contexts in which public policy must balance respect for 
autonomy against fear of the consequences of misjudgment, bad luck, or both, 
we have turned to disclosure as a remedy. For example, in the context of 
securities regulation, courts have consistently cited disclosure as a guiding 
principle enabling investors to protect themselves. See Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (“[T]he Securities Act of 1933 . . . was 
designed to provide investors with full disclosure of material information 
concerning public offerings of securities in commerce, to protect investors 
against fraud and, through the imposition of specified civil liabilities, to promote 
ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing.”). A disclosure regime would 
require gathering the same information that would be necessary to price loans 
by perceived riskiness of different careers, as Professor Simkovic’s proposal 
would require, but would render unnecessary any forecast of the financial 
rewards of those careers in the future. College and university career 
development offices, as well as individual academic departments and programs, 
could present this information to students. And if disclosure of probable lifetime 
income, which should be a powerful incentive affecting student behavior, is 
insufficient to affect choices of major, that suggests that different interest rates 
will not work either.  
 66. See J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE SORCERER’S STONE 117–18 
(1997) (describing how the sorting hat assigns Hogwarts students to different 
houses). In the Harry Potter books, a magic hat makes the allocation decisions; 
in the real world, an algorithm taking into account student characteristics and 
employers’ anticipated needs would do the trick. 
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vocational.67 I mention the Sorting Hat and the Singapore 
examples not because I think only magic can allocate students as 
well as the former nor because Professor Simkovic’s proposal goes 
so far as the latter, but because I think a better case can be made 
for adoption of an approach like that of Singapore, which would 
be more likely to achieve the desired goal of directing students 
into particular careers, than for adoption of variable interest 
rates.68 Variable interest rates may result in the more 
sophisticated and better informed consumer of higher education 
modifying behavior, at the cost of inflicting higher costs of 
borrowing and potentially higher default rates on less 
sophisticated students.69  
                                                                                                     
 67. See SINGAPORE EXAMINATIONS AND ASSESSMENT BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT 
2011/2012 7 (2012), http://www.seab.gov.sg/aboutUs/annualReport/annual 
Report_11_12/pdf/AnnualReport2012.pdf (describing the various tests used to 
determine what type of education is best for each student). 
 68. Professor Simkovic touches on another strategy, pursued in several 
European countries, to promote study of STEM fields. See Simkovic, supra note 
1, at 644–45 (stating that “[m]ost European and Asian governments that fund 
higher education through taxation have . . . generally prioritized STEM 
instruction and labor market needs to a greater extent than have U.S. students 
and universities” (citing CAROLINE KEARNEY, EFFORTS TO INCREASE STUDENTS’ 
INTEREST IN PURSUING SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING AND MATHEMATICS 
STUDIES AND CAREERS 7–10 (2011))). Significantly, the strategies described in the 
materials upon which Professor Simkovic relies do not involve penalizing 
students who choose to study the humanities, for example, as would his variable 
interest rate proposal. Rather, governments have adopted a “holistic approach” 
aimed at “introducing science and technology learning . . . at primary level, and 
increasing the number of students enrolling in STEM studies at secondary 
level.” CAROLINE KEARNEY, EFFORTS TO INCREASE STUDENTS’ INTEREST IN 
PURSUING SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING AND MATHEMATICS STUDIES AND 
CAREERS 7 (2011). In France, for example, a “national action plan” for teaching 
science and technology aims to  
improv[e] pupils’ mathematical attainment and arous[e] their 
curiosity for sciences and technologies at primary school level; 
deepening curiosity for and interest in scientific and technological 
subjects through cross disciplinary projects at secondary school level; 
and encouraging both girls as well as boys to take up STEM studies, 
providing students with better and more comprehensive STEM career 
guidance, and developing specialized STEM upper secondary schools. 
Id. at 9. Such an approach focuses on carrots, not sticks, to encourage STEM 
studies. 
 69. See supra Part II.B. (warning of the adverse impact of higher interest 
rates on specific student populations); see also supra note 22 (explaining that 
there is great variation among students’ capacity to understand financial 
concepts relating to student loans). A public policy experiment of such scope 
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Imposing on students the government’s vision of the needs of 
the national economy would mark a sharp break with the 
historical treatment of education finance, which has allowed 
students to use federal aid money to pay to attend whatever 
program they choose, to study what they choose.70 Professor 
Simkovic’s proposal does not go so far but instead moves aid 
policy along a continuum, adding an incentive to augment the 
signal that is already sent by wages and striking a different 
balance between student autonomy and employer need.71 Higher 
interest rates would potentially lead to more defaults by those 
students who choose majors not associated with higher wages and 
lower unemployment rates. Higher interest rates would penalize 
the less financially sophisticated consumer of student loans. 
Historically, lawmakers have not gone so far. They have 
permitted students to use federal aid to enroll in postsecondary 
programs that fail to graduate most enrollees, that produce 
graduates chronically unable to find employment, and that leave 
borrowers facing a high likelihood of default.72 I will address the 
issue of autonomy below,73 but I mention here the possibility of 
directing students’ choices of major to drive home the point that 
                                                                                                     
must be preceded by more thorough study of what the effects might be. An 
incremental step that does not impose such risks on certain borrowers might 
involve better, more accurate disclosure of wages associated with particular 
majors, to determine whether postgraduate wage information would impact 
students’ decisions. Indeed, a ranking system for colleges proposed by President 
Obama may take into account graduates’ earnings. See Shear & Lewin, supra 
note 31.  
 70. See Choosing a College to Receive Your Information, FAFSA, 
https://fafsa.ed.gov/help/fotwf.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2013) (explaining how 
students applying for federal aid money can choose which colleges students 
want to receive their information) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). Change is not inherently bad. Change that creates a significant risk of 
adverse effects on students who will not have the option of re-financing their 
college education, however, should not be embarked upon lightly. 
 71. See Simkovic, supra note 1, at 530 (outlining Professor Simkovic’s 
proposal to implement “risk-based pricing in federal student loans” and 
describing the perceived benefits of this proposal). 
 72. See, e.g., William D. Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorsky, The Law School 
Bubble: How Long Will it Last if Law Grads Can’t Pay Bills?, A.B.A. J., Jan. 
2012, at 30, 32–33 (describing how law students who have small chances of 
landing jobs after graduating from law school still receive significant amounts of 
federal student aid and predicting that the inability of graduates to pay back 
loans makes this trend unsustainable). 
 73. See infra Part IV. 
2158 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2137 (2013) 
whether the mechanism is indirect, using interest rates as a 
nudge, or direct, through command, the animating philosophy is 
the same: the government knows better than the student what 
the student should study and ultimately, do and be. 
III. How Big Is the Problem? 
Pricing of student loans based on choice of major purports to 
address a “mismatch” between the courses of study pursued by 
undergraduates, on the one hand, and the needs of employers, on 
the other. This mismatch results, Professor Simkovic writes, in 
higher unemployment rates, lower wages, and more frequent 
student loan defaults by graduates in certain majors.74 In the 
previous Part, I suggested that the gap he describes may be the 
result of students’ insensitivity to financial signals like wages 
and interest rates. I argued that such insensitivity may itself be 
evidence that his proposal to base interest rates on choice of 
major will not succeed and, in addition, will have undesirable 
effects.75 In this Part, I question both the extent to which the 
phenomenon of mismatch exists and the strength of any causal 
relationship to choices of undergraduate major, and argue that in 
the absence of stronger evidence, Professor Simkovic’s proposal 
lacks justification.  
This Part has two sections. First, I argue that the evidence of 
a gap between employee education and employer need is weak: 
some expressing concern have significant economic reasons to 
claim there is a problem and most references to “mismatch” cover 
the workforce overall and do not purport to comment on choices of 
undergraduate major. Second, even if there were “mismatch,” 
choice of major is not the obvious culprit.  
                                                                                                     
 74. See Simkovic, supra note 1, at 530 (explaining the results of the 
mismatch and how these results could be fixed with risk-based student loans). 
 75. See supra Part II. 
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A. There Is Weak Evidence of “Mismatch” Between What College 
Students Study and What Employers Need 
The severity of the “mismatch” problem, which adjusting 
student loan interest rates purports to address, is open to 
question. The perception of a skilled labor shortage has been 
fueled in recent years by reports in the popular press76 that have 
typically quoted executives of high technology companies 
complaining of a lack of home-grown, potential employees who 
have the educational background required to do cutting-edge 
work.77 But other media reports have pointed out that it is 
cheaper for these employers to hire highly skilled employees from 
overseas, giving them an economic incentive to hire from 
abroad.78 Such hiring might be cast as unpatriotic, were it not for 
the explanation that these companies offer.79 In addition, 
employers have “repeatedly demonstrated a preference for 
immigrants over native workers . . . based on their beliefs that 
immigrants are hardworking, subservient, easier to control, and 
so on.”80 At least one study found that employers’ difficulty 
                                                                                                     
 76. Typically these media reports have reported on a gap between employee 
skills and employer needs in the context of a national debate on immigration 
reform. Technology companies have consistently sought the ability to hire more 
highly skilled workers from overseas. See, e.g., Letter from Am. Council of Eng’g 
Cos. et al. to Members of the United States House of Representatives (July 12, 
2012), http://judiciary.house.gov/news/ pdfs/STEM.pdf (calling on Congress to 
adopt legislation enabling American companies to hire more foreign workers 
with advanced degrees in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics).  
 77. See, e.g., MICROSOFT CORP., A NATIONAL TALENT STRATEGY: IDEAS FOR 
SECURING U.S. COMPETITIVENESS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 3, http://www.microsoft. 
com/en-us/news/download/presskits/citizenship/MSNTS.pdf (warning of a 
“substantial and increasing shortage of individuals with the skills needed to fill 
the jobs the private sector is creating”). 
 78. See, e.g., Charles Duhigg & Keith Bradsher, How the U.S. Lost Out on 
iPhone Work, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2012, at A1 (describing how Apple is forced to 
employ overseas employees because of the cost and efficiency of foreign labor). 
 79. See Jordan Weissmann, The Myth of America’s Tech-Talent Shortage, 
ATLANTIC, Apr. 29, 2013, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/business/ 
archive/2013/04/the-myth-of-americas-tech-talent-shortage/275319/ (observing 
that employers hiring highly skilled workers from abroad “are required to pay 
them on par with U.S.-born professionals . . . [but t]hanks to an array of legal 
loopholes in the way appropriate wages are calculated . . . it doesn’t necessarily 
work out that way”). 
 80. Jennifer Gordon, Tensions in Rhetoric and Reality at the Intersection of 
Work and Immigration, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 125, 136–37 (2012). Employers 
2160 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2137 (2013) 
finding workers to hire has resulted from too much selectivity by 
companies.81 And an examination of the information technology 
labor market and the pipeline of students in technology-related 
fields concluded that the “United States has more than a 
sufficient supply of workers available to work in [science, 
technology, engineering and mathematics] occupations.”82   
While unemployment rates do vary among graduates who 
major in different fields,83 unemployment rates decline as 
                                                                                                     
thus can be expected to adopt rhetoric, including lamentations of a skills 
shortage in the domestic workforce, which enables them to continue to draw on 
immigrant labor. 
 81. See Paul Davidson, Study Says Shortage of Skilled Workers Not That 
Severe, USA TODAY, Oct. 15, 2012, available at http://www. 
usatoday.com/story/money/business/2012/10/14/jobs-skills-gap-study/1630359/ 
(citing a study by the Boston Consulting Group that found that the United 
States is short by 80,000 to 100,000 highly skilled manufacturing workers, or 
less than 1% of the nation’s manufacturing workers and less than 8% of its 
highly skilled manufacturing workers) (citing Press Release, Bos. Consulting 
Grp., Skills Gap in U.S. Manufacturing Is Less Pervasive Than Many Believe 
(Oct. 15, 2012), available at 
http://www.bcg.com/media/PressReleaseDetails.aspx?id=tcm: 12-118945 (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review)). 
 82. Hal Salzman, Daniel Kuehn & B. Lindsay Lowell, Guestworkers in the 
High-Skill U.S. Labor Market: An Analysis of Supply, Employment and Wage 
Trends 2 (Econ. Pol’y Inst. Briefing Paper No. 359, Apr. 24, 2013), 
http://www.epi.org/files/2013/bp359-guestworkers-high-skill-labor-market-analy 
sis.pdf (emphasis omitted).  
A survey of 704 employers by the Chronicle of Higher Education found that 
nineteen percent of employers overall and twenty-nine percent of employers in 
the science, technology, or health care sectors looked for specific majors in 
potential hires. THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., THE ROLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
IN CAREER DEVELOPMENT: EMPLOYER PERCEPTIONS 14 (Dec. 2012), 
http://chronicle.com/items/biz/pdf/Employers%20Survey.pdf.  
 83. Variances often exist in interesting ways, according to a report drawing 
on Census Bureau data. Unemployment among architects who recently 
graduated is more than double the rate among graduates with degrees in 
education, reflecting the fact that the recent downturn in the economy adversely 
and severely affected the construction and real estate sectors. See ANTHONY P. 
CARNEVALE, BAN CHEAH & JEFF STROHL, GEORGETOWN UNIV. CTR. ON EDUC. & 
THE WORKFORCE, HARD TIMES, COLLEGE MAJORS, UNEMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS: 
NOT ALL COLLEGE DEGREES ARE CREATED EQUAL 7 (Jan. 4, 2012), available at 
http://cew.georgetown.edu/unemployment (using Census Bureau data to identify 
the often surprising and interesting ways in which employment rates differ). 
This Georgetown study also found that even within general major fields, certain 
specialized areas enjoyed lower unemployment rates: Graduates who majored in 
mechanical engineering and who have some experience, for example, face a 
lower unemployment rate than do computer science majors with experience. Id. 
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experience levels increase.84 This forces a value judgment about 
what level of unemployment should drive policy decisions, the 
rate at graduation or subsequently, and about what rate of 
unemployment is indicative of mismatch. The lowest 
unemployment rates identified in one post-recession study of 
Census Bureau wage and employment data were enjoyed by 
graduates who had some work experience and who majored in life 
science, education, health, or agriculture and natural resources.85 
Comparable graduates who majored in computer science and 
mathematics, engineering, or business all had higher rates of 
unemployment, but all rates were under 5%.86 Earnings and 
unemployment do not necessarily move together; those who 
majored in education earned less than those who majored in 
engineering, for example.87 This pattern raises a question: which 
indicator of default should matter, the unemployment rate 
experienced by graduates in a particular major or the wage paid 
to them?  
If choosing different courses of study results in a greater 
chance of employability, using data on overall employment to 
draw conclusions about the experiences of college graduates is 
somewhat misleading.88 A better question might be: is the 
unemployment rate among college graduates higher—and if so, 
by how much and for how much longer—because too many 
graduates have chosen to pursue majors in fields that do not lead 
to employment? Professor Simkovic cites the differences in wages 
paid to graduates with different majors and unemployment rates 
                                                                                                     
at 11–12. Those with degrees in elementary education face lower unemployment 
rates than either. Id. 
 84. See id. at 7–15 (noting that those graduates with some experience in 
their fields of study generally enjoy lower rates of unemployment than those 
graduates who merely earn a degree).  
 85. Id. at 4, 7–15. 
 86. Id. at 7–15. 
 87. Id. at 11–12. 
 88. See id. at 4–6 (demonstrating that the employment rates of college 
graduates are affected by multiple factors, including major field of study as well 
as experience in said field). Professor Simkovic contends that higher rates of 
unemployment and lower wages for graduates in specific majors are evidence of 
mismatch. Simkovic, supra note 1, at 530. However, studies of mismatch do not 
draw that conclusion. See infra note 92 (describing the scope of research on 
mismatch between workforce skills and employer need). 
2162 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2137 (2013) 
at time of graduation.89 Earning less and/or being unemployed 
both help predict default, but so do other factors, including 
parental education and family income, for example.90 Higher 
interest rates in addition to a lower salary and a higher risk of 
unemployment punish the graduate who is least able to manage 
that higher monthly loan payment, to say nothing of the student 
who does not complete a course of study.91 
Whether there is a “mismatch” in the workforce overall says 
little about the significance of undergraduate choice of major.92 
                                                                                                     
 89. See Simkovic, supra note 1, at 540–42 (noting, for example, that in 
2011, engineering majors received significantly higher starting salary offers 
than visual and performing arts majors). However, Professor Simkovic also cites 
to a study suggesting that students are rational in choosing majors that put 
them on a path to higher lifetime earnings, rather than those that produce the 
highest wages initially. Id. at 571 n.117 (citing Mark C. Berger, Predicted 
Future Earnings and Choice of College Major, 41 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 418, 
427 (1988)). If this finding is true, then variable pricing of student loans—if it 
were to have a significant effect at all, which I argue it would not, see supra Part 
II—could skew students toward pursuing the major associated with the 
quickest. 
 90. See Thomas A. Flint, Predicting Student Loan Defaults, 68 J. HIGHER 
EDUC. 322, 341 (1997) (stating that evidence regarding family wealth, for 
example whether or not a family has a bank account, is often an unmeasured 
influence on student loan repayment). 
 91. Failure to complete a course of study is a powerful predictor of loan 
default. See Gross, Cekic, Hossler & Hillman, supra note 32, at 25 (surveying 
research and concluding that “completing a postsecondary program is the 
strongest single predictor of not defaulting regardless of institution type”). 
 92. It may indicate, however, that more workers need more postsecondary 
education or better preparation in particular skills. See Simkovic, supra note 1, 
at 588 (discussing the structural unemployment that results when employment 
opportunities are available, but graduates do not have the particular skills 
needed). Professor Simkovic cites a comment by Narayana Kocherlakota, the 
president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, to the effect that “[f]irms 
have jobs, but can’t find appropriate workers.” Narayana Kocherlakota, 
President, Fed. Res. Bank of Minneapolis, President’s Speech at Missoula, 
Montana: Back Inside the FOMC (Sept. 8, 2010), http://www.minneapolisfed. 
org/news_events/pres/kocherlakota_speech_09082010.pdf. However, the 
comment purported to describe the workforce overall, not college graduates only. 
See id. (making no mention of college graduates in particular). A study of 
mismatch found that workers who were mismatched—that is, whose jobs were 
only partially or not at all related to their areas of study—earn less than 
graduates who are matched, but, significantly, found that the effect on wages 
was smaller for graduates in particular fields of study. John Robst, Education 
and Job Match: The Relatedness of College Major and Work, 26 ECON. EDUC. 
REV. 397, 405–06 (2007). So while liberal arts majors were more likely to 
experience mismatch, the costs of that mismatch were relatively low. Id. The 
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One study that examined the effect of mismatch by major 
suggested that the impact on wages of working in an area less 
closely related to major field of study was less, the less that major 
                                                                                                     
author of the study concluded that mismatch exists in an efficient labor market, 
meaning that it “does not necessarily imply a substantial imbalance in the 
college education market.” Id. at 406. Professor Simkovic also cites findings of a 
McKinsey Global Institute study as evidence of mismatch, but that study did 
not focus on the question of whether students were majoring in fields associated 
with low wages and high unemployment (and certainly did not address student 
loan default). See Simkovic, supra note 1, at 570 n.112 (“[E]mployers still have 
trouble finding workers with specific skills. And many students lack a clear 
picture of which jobs and skills will be in high demand.” (citing BYRON AUGUSTE 
ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., AN ECONOMY THAT WORKS: JOB CREATION AND 
AMERICA’S FUTURE 57 (2011))). Rather, the McKinsey study focused on the lack 
of needed skills in the workforce generally, as well as among college students. 
See BYRON AUGUST ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., AN ECONOMY THAT WORKS: 
JOB CREATION AND AMERICA’S FUTURE 57 (2011) (claiming that despite the 
billions of dollars spent annually on postsecondary education and job training 
programs, too few Americans have skills employers said they sought). Further, 
the study does not make clear whether this skills gap is related to potential 
workers’ lack of subject-specific knowledge or whether the skills gap reflects a 
more basic lack in generally applicable skills, such as critical thinking or 
writing. See id. (referring solely to “skills”). Although the McKinsey study 
elsewhere reports that student choices of major may not reflect employer needs, 
id. at 40, the reason that employers most frequently gave for not hiring a job 
applicant was insufficient job experience (45% of 1,285 employers responding to 
the survey), not lack of educational qualifications (16% of employers). Id. at 78 
app. B, exhibit B5. The study calls for better disclosure of wages paid and skills 
sought, id. at 57, as I have proposed. The other source cited by Professor 
Simkovic similarly refers to a lack of “applied skills” among college students. See 
Simkovic, supra note 1, at 570 n.112 (quoting ERIN SPARKS & MARY JO WAITS, 
NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N CTR. FOR BEST PRACTICES, DEGREES FOR WHAT JOBS? 
RAISING EXPECTATIONS FOR UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 8 
(2011)). Interestingly, that study goes on to describe a shortage of nurses, rather 
than engineers or other graduates with majors in STEM fields that Professor 
Simkovic generally focuses on. See ERIN SPARKS & MARY JO WAITS, NAT’L 
GOVERNORS ASS’N CTR. FOR BEST PRACTICES, DEGREES FOR WHAT JOBS? RAISING 
EXPECTATIONS FOR UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 8 (2011) 
(noting that forty-six out of fifty states face a shortage of nurses). Finally, a 
study of “mismatch” by an economist whom Professor Simkovic cites does 
develop a model offering explanations of gaps between employees and jobs, but 
it does not evaluate the role of education, let alone choice of major, on the ability 
to find employment. See Robert Shimer, Mismatch, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1074 
(2007) (arguing that unemployment can persist when job vacancies exist 
because of mismatch at any given time between unemployed workers’ location 
and skillset, on the one hand, and employers’ location and needs, on the other 
hand). 
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taught occupation-specific skills.93 The national unemployment 
rate among college graduates,94 3.8% as of this writing, is less 
than half the unemployment rate overall, 7.4%.95 For some 
majors it is higher, for some majors it is lower, sometimes for 
purely cyclical reasons.96 Neither the aggregate nor the specific 
data can answer the question of when the difference in 
unemployment rates across fields or majors is sizable or long-
lasting enough that corrective action is appropriate. 
                                                                                                     
 93.  See Robst, supra note 92, at 406 (“The balance between supply and 
demand is less of an issue in college majors teaching general skills, since such 
skills transfer to other occupations.”).   
 94. The government lumps together those with a bachelor’s degree or more. 
News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, The Employment 
Situation (Aug. 2013), http://bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf. 
 95. Id. The unemployment rate among recent college graduates, ages 
twenty to twenty-nine, is much higher: 13.5% in 2011. Thomas Luke Spreen, 
Recent College Graduates in the U.S. Labor Force: Data From the Current 
Population Survey, MONTHLY LABOR REV., Feb. 2013, at 9 tbl. 5, http://www. 
bls.gov/opub/mlr/2013/02/art1full.pdf. In that age bracket in the labor force 
overall, the unemployment rate was 12.6%. Id. Nonetheless, the overall lower 
unemployment rate for those with at least a bachelor’s degree suggests that 
these recent graduates will find employment and, if the past remains a reliable 
guide, should enjoy an earnings boost as a result of their higher education. In a 
recession, it is reasonable to expect the unemployment rate to rise for new labor 
market entrants; as of this writing, it is far from clear whether the 
unemployment rate among recent college graduates is cyclical and soon to fall, 
or whether it is structural and likely to persist. Historically, low unemployment 
among holders of college degrees is the norm. Data Retrieval: Labor Force 
Statistics, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, bls.gov/webapps/legacy/cpsatab4.htm 
(scroll to the bottom of the page and under the “Bachelor’s Degree and Higher” 
section, click the box where “Unemployment Rate” intersects with the “Not 
Seasonally Adjusted” row; click “Retrieve Data;” then change the “Output 
Options” at the top of the page by scrolling up to “1992” in the first date range; 
then click “Go”) (last visited Sept. 23, 2013) (listing unemployment rates for 
holders of bachelor’s degrees or higher from 1992–2013) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 96. See CARNEVALE, CHEAH & STROHL, supra note 83, at 5 (suggesting that 
the growth or collapse of an industry can affect the employment rates for 
associated majors).  
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B. Students’ Choices of Major Do Not Determine Likelihood of 
Student Loan Default 
A second problem offered to justify the proposal is the cost of 
borrower defaults.97 The argument is, because students choose 
majors in fields associated with lower pay, they graduate with 
low-value degrees and significant debt burdens, and are more 
likely to default on their loans, pay less in taxes, suffer 
unemployment, and consume more public resources.98 In the case 
                                                                                                     
 97. Whether the cost of defaults has exceeded revenue generated by 
student loan borrowers who have made payment is a subject of debate. Senator 
Elizabeth Warren has criticized student lending, saying that the federal 
government would earn tens of billions of dollars in profit from aid programs 
and that such earnings were “obscene.” Ruth Tam, Warren: Profits From 
Student Loans are ‘Obscene,’ WASH. POST. (July 17, 2013, 11:23 AM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/07/17/warren-profit 
s-from-student-loans-are-obscene/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2013) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). In recent years default rates—which I have 
noted elsewhere are an imperfect measure of repayment, Glater, supra note 58, 
at 63—have risen, no doubt as a result of a combination of events, most notably 
the recession that began with the financial crisis of 2008. See Press Release, 
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Student Loan Default Rates Increase (Sept. 13, 2010) 
(concluding that the increasing default rates amongst students are a result of 
“very difficult economic times”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). No one has yet shown conclusively that the federal government is 
losing, has lost, or is in danger of losing money as a result of a rising default 
rate on education loans in general, let alone as a result of students’ choices of 
major. To date, the government has consistently reported making money off of 
student lending. See Simkovic, supra note 1, at 530 (noting that federal student 
loan programs have generated a profit for the government). Student lending 
could be intended to maximize government revenue, in which case the interest 
rate charged should be set at the highest possible rate consistent with 
maximizing future tax revenue from the higher incomes earned by graduates. 
Student lending could seek to maximize national competitiveness or societal 
welfare, meaning terms of loans should fluctuate with national needs as 
determined by lawmakers. Or student lending could seek to achieve the best 
student outcome, perhaps maximizing student earnings, student happiness, the 
odds of repayment of loans, or some combination of these three factors. 
Policymakers have not limited themselves to just one goal, but have focused 
broadly on promoting access. See, e.g., Arne Duncan, Sec’y, Dep’t of Educ., 
Address at the 91st Annual Meeting of the American Council on Education (Feb. 
9, 2009), available at http://www2.ed.gov/news/speeches/2009/02/02092009.html 
(emphasizing the importance of “ensur[ing] that federal loans continue to be 
available to every student and parent that qualifies—and . . . [of] keep[ing] 
college affordable”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 98. See Flint, supra note 90, at 330 (“[S]ome studies show that majoring in 
more academically rigorous disciplines related to science and technology (such 
as engineering) decreases the probability of default.”). 
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of federal loans, taxpayers are thus potentially exposed to 
losses.99 But academic studies have not concluded that choice of 
major is a powerful predictor of default, with some finding 
evidence of an effect, and others not.100 Some evidence exists that 
grades are a better predictor of likelihood of default.101 So is 
wealth: a graduate who is independently wealthy is a good risk 
even after choosing a low-pay career, while a poor graduate who 
plans to become a doctor may be more likely to default despite 
career ambitions.102 
Assuming that choice of major determines risk of default 
precludes consideration of other factors that studies have found 
                                                                                                     
 99. See id. at 322 (“Failures to repay student loans result in enormous costs 
to the federal government, which covers the losses to lenders.”).  
 100. See Gross, Cekic, Hosler & Hillman, supra note 32, at 25 (describing 
one study that found the effects on default of choice of major disappeared after 
controlling for total debt and postgraduate earnings, and another study finding 
a higher probability of difficulty with repayment among students entering fields 
with lower expected earnings).   
 101. See Flint, supra note 90, at 343 (noting that “higher GPAs are 
associated with avoidance of default”). The article does find that “greater 
incongruence between undergraduate major and current employment are risk 
factors” for default, id., but this finding must be considered in light of other 
research on congruence between major and employment that concluded that 
congruence matters more in some fields and less in others. See Robst, supra note 
92, at 405–06 (noting, for example, that while liberal arts majors experience 
higher mismatch, the cost of this mismatch is “insignificant”). Importantly, the 
Robst study concluded that where the penalty for a mismatch between job and 
degree field is higher, less risk of mismatch exists in that field. Id. at 406. So, for 
example, an engineer would pay a steeper wage penalty for working as 
something other than an engineer, while a liberal arts major would pay an 
insignificant premium for working in another field. Id. at 405. These results, the 
author observed, “are suggestive that this type of mismatch exists in an efficient 
labor market.” Id. at 406; see also J. Fredericks Volkwein & Bruce P. Szelest, 
Individual and Campus Characteristics Associated with Student Loan Default, 
36 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 41, 52 (1995) (concluding that the “lowest default rates 
are associated with academic performance above 3.0, a major in one of the 
Biglan pure/hard/nonlife subjects like chemistry, geology or mathematics, and 
attending a specialized institution such as a business college, engineering school 
or seminary”).  
 102. See Gross, Cekic, Hosler & Hillman, supra note 32, at 23 (“Families 
with more money are able to provide a financial safety net unavailable to 
students from lower-income families, who are more likely to need such a 
resource given their greater levels of debt. This safety net also helps students to 
meet their loan obligations through fluctuations in personal income.”). 
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relevant.103 Consider a student who chooses to major in art 
history, presumably a low-pay field, but who does very well in 
school and becomes an appraiser for an auction house. Should 
that student face a higher interest rate ex ante than a student 
who, responding to differences in loan pricing, abandons a major 
in English literature to become a very mediocre business 
administration student and ends up in a job that pays less than 
that obtained by the graduate with the art history degree?104 
Basing the interest rate of a student loan on choice of major, 
which may or may not correlate with the value of the job 
ultimately taken by that student, makes less sense than does 
making an adjustment to the interest rate ex post, with the 
benefit of knowing the career choices the student actually made. 
IV. Education Is Different 
In the Introduction to this Article, I suggested that deciding 
the extent to which tools of the marketplace should play a role in 
the setting of education policy is a difficult task. We have already 
adopted the use of credit, we allow families to save for college 
through tax-advantaged accounts,105 and the interest rate on 
federal loans was recently pegged to the government’s cost of 
borrowing.106 These moves tie education finance more closely to 
                                                                                                     
 103. See id. at 21 (listing factors such as family income, race/ethnicity, type 
of institution, field of study, students’ financial aid and the amount of debt they 
incur, and students’ employment and income after college). 
 104. Using loan forgiveness and income-based repayment assistance 
programs avoids having to make such choices at all and effectively enables loan 
prices to be set ex post, on the basis of what graduates actually do and on what 
they actually earn. Such back-end programs do not undermine success stories 
that look improbable when the criterion for evaluation is choice of major. This is 
also the approach that lawmakers have taken. See infra Part IV.A (suggesting 
that lawmakers are attempting to make particular fields of study more 
attractive despite the associated low wages). 
 105. See 529 Plans: Questions and Answers, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/uac/529-
Plans:-Questions-and-Answers (last visited Aug. 9, 2013) (describing the 529 
plan and discussing its benefits and drawbacks) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 106. See Jeremy W. Peters & Ashley Parker, An Unusual Feat in Congress: 
Student Loan Bill Breezes On, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2013, at A10 (noting that 
“Congress set a cap on all loans: 8.25[%] for undergraduates, 9.5 for graduate 
students and 10.5 for PLUS recipients”). 
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financial markets. Should access to higher education further 
reflect markets, for example by allowing interest rates to vary 
with students’ choices of major? That far, I argue, we should not 
go because education differs fundamentally from other 
investments. 
In this Part, I demonstrate that this recognition of the 
special character of education is well-established and that 
freedom to make choices about higher education is a protected 
and essential personal liberty. In the first section, I describe 
lawmakers’ determination to promote and protect access to 
education generally, as an end in itself, on the basis of a broad 
conception of what is in the national interest. In the second 
section, I describe the special role that education plays in our 
society, as a public good and an engine of social mobility. Finally, 
I briefly note the importance that the Supreme Court has 
attached to education. 
A. Lawmakers Have Adopted Policies that Promote Access to 
Education Generally on the Basis of a Broad View of 
What Is in the National Interest 
Drawing on the history of the legislation that created the 
earliest form of the modern federal student loan finance system, 
Professor Simkovic concludes that funding of higher education 
was intended to achieve three goals: increasing the supply of 
skilled labor, promoting economic and technological development, 
and promoting social mobility.107 As I have noted elsewhere,108 
the legislation that led to federal student lending represented a 
response to the perceived advances of the Soviet Union in science 
and technology; members of Congress sought to enable more 
students to develop knowledge and expertise in those fields 
deemed most essential to securing and defending both national 
defense and economic preeminence.109 
                                                                                                     
 107. Simkovic, supra note 1, at 530. 
 108. See Glater, supra note 58, at 37 (discussing the National Defense 
Education Act in relation to the launch of the Sputnik satellite). 
 109. See id. (discussing the push for education in scientific and technical 
fields). Concern over national competitiveness animated expansion of federal 
student aid programs in the 1960s, as I have pointed out elsewhere, because the 
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Yet lawmakers did not adopt a strategy akin to that 
advocated by Professor Simkovic. They avoided using aid 
programs to transmit labor market signals to students, because 
they did not view wages as a reliable sign of value. Lawmakers 
sought to encourage students to pursue fields of study deemed 
essential to the nation. Perceptions have not changed much in the 
ensuing years: lawmakers then as now worried about drawing 
more students into teaching, the study of foreign languages, as 
well as STEM fields.110 Lawmakers have explicitly rejected a 
narrow focus on specific areas of study to be singled out for 
special government support: 
There is danger too in gearing our educational system to the 
development of a race of supermen and superwomen concerned 
only with intellectual pursuits, exclusive scientific horizons, 
and social experiments. American education must never be 
allowed to become lopsided on one side or another. It must 
provide broad, adequate facilities for all our young citizens and 
at the same time it must scrupulously avoid Federal 
regimentation and over-emphasis upon science, technology or 
purely intellectual activities alone. 
It is quality, not quantity alone, that we must seek in our 
higher education, but that quality must extend to and embrace 
all educational fields and not just science and mathematics. As 
important as these subjects are, they must be part of a 
composite picture, which includes all fields of learning and 
particularly those fields that relate to the welfare and 
betterment of man as an individual being endowed with a 
human soul rather than as a robot responsive to the tick of 
some scientific gadget. The spiritual must ever prevail as the 
dominant feature of our system. 111 
                                                                                                     
launch of Sputnik by the Soviet Union raised fears of an education gap between 
that country and the United States. Id. 
 110. See Simkovic, supra note 1, at 591 (“Indeed, the original NDEA 
emphasized the importance of training more teachers as well as STEM 
specialists, and current student loan programs include special loan forgiveness 
provisions for teachers.” (citing Teacher Loan Forgiveness, FEDERAL STUDENT 
AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/forgiveness-cancellation/charts/teacher 
#what-are-the-eligibility (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review))). 
 111. 1958 CONG. REC. H16684-5 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1958) (statement of Rep. 
Elliott) (voicing support of the National Defense Education Act, which created 
the early version of the federal student loan programs). 
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Lawmakers chose to make aid broadly available and then 
selected particular fields that they believed were of special 
importance and attempted to make those fields more attractive in 
spite of low wages112—fighting incentives created by labor 
markets rather than reinforcing them.113  
When creating the guaranteed student loan program that is 
the ancestor of current federal programs, lawmakers “provided 
for improved elementary and secondary school teaching in 
science, mathematics, and foreign languages, as well as 
funding . . . for higher education.”114 But their views of what the 
nation needed extended beyond fields in which critics decry an 
employee shortfall.115 In debate over the Higher Education Act of 
                                                                                                     
 112. See Glater, supra note 58, at 31–32 (describing federal incentives that 
aim to encourage students to select particular majors of national importance—
for example, public safety—regardless of the likely low wages). One could make 
a case that given the higher salaries that students pursuing particular courses 
of study might be expected to earn, those students should pay higher interest 
rates on their loans, in order to subsidize the educations of those launching 
themselves on less lucrative career paths. What Professor Simkovic contends is 
a “perverse” cross-subsidy under the current, fixed interest rate system—
students likely to command high wages pay an interest rate that is higher than 
they otherwise might and students likely to earn lower wages pay an interest 
rate that is lower than they otherwise might, Simkovic, supra note 1, at 590—
others might contend is one of the current regime’s virtues. See id. at 590–92 
(discussing those scholars who advocate for this redistributive model). Professor 
Simkovic’s variable interest rate regime would create its own inequity, giving 
students of more limited means less freedom to choose a particular course of 
study. 
 113. In fact, lawmakers have gone so far as to single out professions 
generally perceived as highly compensated for tougher treatment: Congress has 
made it more difficult for medical school graduates to discharge student loans in 
bankruptcy than ordinary student loans, penalizing rather than rewarding 
students who pursue courses of study likely to lead to more lucrative 
employment. See 42 U.S.C. § 292f(g) (2012) (requiring a bankruptcy judge to 
find that “nondischarge of such debt would be unconscionable” when a borrower 
attends an “eligible institution,” defined as a “school of medicine, osteopathic 
medicine, dentistry” (42 U.S.C. § 292o(1))). 
 114. Glater, supra note 58, at 37. 
 115. It is instructive that lawmakers saw foreign languages as essential to 
national competitiveness, thus evincing a view of national needs that extends 
well beyond the needs or desires of employers. More recently, governors have 
voiced concern not only about the technical skills of workforces in the states, but 
also about the role of the arts and culture in generating economic growth. ERIN 
SPARKS & MARY JO WAITS, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, NEW ENGINES OF GROWTH: 
ARTS, CULTURE AND DESIGN 3 (Nancy Geltman ed., 2012), 
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1965,116 which expanded the system of guaranteed student loans 
made by private lenders on terms set by the government, 
members of Congress did not limit their justifications of a 
government role in financing postsecondary education to 
economic considerations,117 or even to national defense.118 Nor did 
they focus solely on science, technology, engineering and 
mathematics—the STEM disciplines.119 And they did not focus on 
maximizing graduates’ earnings; their vision was broader. 
In general,120 neither federal grants nor federal loans are 
contingent on study of subjects deemed most important for the 
national defense or the national economy. Instead, lawmakers 
have created programs designed to encourage graduates to 
pursue careers deemed particularly valuable, creating loan 
repayment assistance programs that effectively lower students’ 
cost of credit ex post.121 Such moves make sense because it is the 
                                                                                                     
http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/1204NEWENGINESOFGROWT
H.PDF. 
 116. Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 129 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
 117. Simkovic, supra note 1, at 531. Professor Simkovic explains his decision to 
avoid discussion of “moral or philosophical views about the ideal purpose of 
education or its proper role in society” because “government support for higher 
education in the United States has primarily been driven by economic 
considerations.” Id.  
 118. Many contemporary policymakers have adopted a broader view of the role 
of postsecondary education, too. A recent report of the National Governors 
Association, for example, offers examples of states using “arts, culture, and design 
[as] a compelling part of their economic solutions.” SPARKS & WAITS, supra note 115, 
at 3. 
 119. See Higher Education Act of 1965: Hearings Before the Spec. Subcomm. on 
Educ. of the Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 89th Cong. 83 (1965) (“A student could use 
a guaranteed loan at any accredited institution of higher education or at an 
accredited business, technical, or vocational school which offers postsecondary 
programs designed to fit students for useful employment.”). 
 120. There are exceptions, such as the federal Teacher Education Assistance for 
College and Higher Education or “TEACH” Grant, which provides scholarships for 
students pursuing teaching careers. FED. STUDENT AID, TEACH GRANT PROGRAM FACT 
SHEET 1 (2013), studentaid.ed.gov/sites/default/files/teach-grant_0.pdf. 
 121. Such incentives are so popular that not only do they exist under the aegis 
of the federal Department of Education but also within numerous states. At the 
federal level, the Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program is available to graduates 
who work for a public service organization, such as a not-for-profit, tax-exempt 
organization, a government organization, or other organization. FED. STUDENT AID, 
PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN FORGIVENESS PROGRAM FACT SHEET 2–3 (2013), 
http://studentaid.ed.gov/sites/default/files/public-service-loan-forgiveness.pdf. At the 
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career actually embarked upon, rather than the major selected, 
that determines both the contribution to society and the ability to 
repay. There is no reason to impose on a student borrower a 
penalty for selecting a particular course of study at the front end 
if the same effect can be achieved at the back end, when better 
information is available on jobs actually taken, unless the threat 
of imposition of the penalty will redirect students—and there is 
not strong evidence that variable student loan pricing will have 
the desired effect.122 
Lawmakers extended early loan forgiveness programs to 
teachers working in poorer communities, expanded construction 
grants to support institutions investing in buildings for the arts 
and humanities, and provided funding for study of foreign 
languages.123 They also established a National Teacher Corps to 
send college graduates into primary and secondary schools.124 
Lawmakers discussed the riskiness of requiring students to 
pursue particular courses of study in the debate over the 
legislation creating the Corps, but they concluded that “it [wa]s 
unwise for the Federal Government to induce people to go into a 
particular occupation as though that occupation were more 
important than other occupations.”125  
Lawmakers’ decisions reflect societal values. More recently, 
Congress expanded loan forgiveness for people working in any 
“area of national need,” which federal legislation identified as 
                                                                                                     
state level, California has a program to assist loan repayment by health 
professionals who work in underserved areas. California State Loan Repayment 
Program, STATE OF CAL. OFF. OF STATEWIDE HEALTH PLANNING & DEV., 
http://www.oshpd.ca.gov/HWDD/SLRP.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2013) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 122. Supra Part II. 
 123. 111 CONG. REC. 22,666 (1965) (statement of Sen. Javits). 
 124. 111 CONG. REC. 27,695 (1965) (statement of Rep. Meeds). Congress did 
not specify those fields that teachers were supposed to teach in the classroom; 
the goal was encouraging college graduates to go into teaching at all. Id. at 
27,592. 
 125. 111 CONG. REC. 21,885 (1965) (statement of Rep. Quie). Representative 
Quie went on to propose, unsuccessfully, that loan forgiveness for teachers not 
be included in the legislation. Id. More recently, in approving legislation that 
pegged federal student loan interest rates to the government’s cost of funds, 
lawmakers made a similar observation, although in a different context, stating 
bluntly that “[p]oliticians should not be in the business of setting student loan 
interest rates.” H.R. REP. NO. 113-82, pt. 1, at 9 (2013). 
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including early childhood educators, nurses, foreign language 
specialists, librarians, many types of schoolteachers, child welfare 
workers, school counselors, medical specialists, mental health 
professionals, dentists, and physical therapists, among others.126 
Lawmakers have not tried to advance national competitiveness 
by augmenting market pressures that already exist, in the form 
of higher wages, to draw students into particular fields.127 
B. Education Plays a Critical Societal Role 
Increasing access to education increases the benefits that 
education confers on a society. This is so because education has 
characteristics of a private and public good—private because 
those with more education tend to enjoy a higher quality of life,128 
and public because education can benefit people other than the 
beneficiary.129 Education appears to promote happiness130 and to 
                                                                                                     
 126. 20 U.S.C. § 1078-11(b) (2012). 
 127. Some colleges have adopted differential pricing for different degrees. 
Jonathan D. Glater, Certain Degrees Now Cost More at Public Universities, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 29, 2007, at A1. However, the pricing adopted by some universities 
reflects higher costs rather than higher postgraduation salaries, such that 
tuition is higher for students pursuing business and engineering degrees, for 
example. Id. These pricing schemes thus could discourage students from 
pursuing these courses of study. Some college and university officials 
interviewed in the article worried that students paying different amounts would 
not feel “part of the larger college,” undermining one of the goals of the 
undergraduate experience, and would not take courses outside of their major 
fields of study. Id. 
 128. Not least because more education typically translates into higher 
lifetime income. See Glater, supra note 58, at 18 (“For individual students, 
access to education helps in realizing life ambitions and may also lead to 
material rewards, as students capture the benefit of the application of their 
trained intellects.”). 
 129. See id. (“While for these financially successful beneficiaries of higher 
education college was clearly a private good, the fruits of their labors still 
benefit the many who use their inventions or learn from their ideas.”). 
 130. See Richard Florida, Charlotta Mellander & Peter J. Rentfrow, The 
Happiness of Cities, 47 REGIONAL STUD. 613, 623 (2013) (suggesting that the 
effect of income on happiness at the metropolitan level is driven more by human 
capital than by income); Catherine Rampell, Does Education Make You Happy?, 
N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG (Feb. 18, 2010, 7:10 PM), http://economix.blogs.ny 
times.com/2010/02/18/does-education-make-you-happy/ (last visited Nov. 20, 
2013) (noting that “educational attainment can help explain a lot of the 
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confer health advantages on the educated.131 The more educated 
citizen benefits the larger community through provision of goods 
and services produced by the educated worker and, in a 
democracy, the contribution of the educated worker’s intellect to 
resolution of problems confronting that community.132 These 
benefits extend beyond the contribution of highly paid workers to 
the public fisc in the form of income taxes, although that adds to 
the justification of a federal role in education finance, too.133 As I 
have argued elsewhere, citing founders of the Republic, education 
offers a bulwark protecting the nation against the threat of 
tyranny.134 
Education also promotes social and socioeconomic mobility; 
those without much wealth can, if they are able to take 
                                                                                                     
variation in well-being levels across American cities”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 131. See, e.g., Fiona E. Matthews et al., A Two-Decade Comparison of 
Prevalence of Dementia in Individuals Aged 65 Years and Older from Three 
Geographical Areas of England: Results of the Cognitive Function and Ageing 
Study I and II, THE LANCET 1, 2 (2013), available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(13)61570-6 (describing a reduction in 
prevalence of dementia over time and attributing a portion of the decline to 
increased education levels in the populations studied); Kaare Christensen et al., 
Physical and Cognitive Functioning of People Older than 90 Years: A 
Comparison of Two Danish Cohorts Born 10 Years Apart, THE LANCET 1, 5 
(2013), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0140-6736(13)60777-1 (finding 
that the group of ninety-year-olds born ten years earlier performed worse on 
cognitive evaluations than did the group born later, although the individuals in 
the later-born group were on average older and attributing a portion of the 
difference to higher levels of education in the second group); see also Gina 
Kolata, Dementia Rate Is Found to Drop Sharply with Better Health and 
Education, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2013, at A8 (summarizing studies on declining 
frequency of dementia in the elderly as confirming that “dementia rates would 
fall and mental acuity improve as the population grew healthier and better 
educated”).  
 132. Id. 
 133. Professor Simkovic recognizes this contribution in his analysis, using it 
as a reason that pricing of student loans based on riskiness would yield benefits 
for the government: more people in high-pay jobs means higher tax revenues, 
Simkovic, supra note 1, at 533 n.8, at least until the labor market corrects and 
wages in a particular field decline. 
 134. See Thomas Jefferson, Preamble to a Bill for the More General 
Diffusion of Knowledge (1778), in 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 526–27 
(Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950) (highlighting the importance of education). I would go 
further; as I have stated elsewhere: “[E]nabling young people to achieve their 
ambitions, to pursue careers that most appeal to them, to realize themselves as 
fully as they can, is a good in itself.” Glater, supra note 58, at 19. 
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advantage of educational opportunities, find more lucrative 
employment than their parents had. Education facilitates 
realization of other aspirations, helping graduates achieve 
positions of influence in the realms of politics, business, and 
academia, to name a few paths.135 Education enables members of 
historically disempowered groups both to improve their own lives 
and to advance the causes of their communities,136 while denial of 
access to education hinders access to the corridors of power.137 
Discriminating among students on the basis of choice of major 
may similarly restrict opportunity for certain students.138 In all 
these ways, education is not like other goods and services whose 
provision the government regulates.139 
Perhaps an argument can be made that raising the cost of 
higher education some modest amount by setting interest rates 
by choice of major does not constitute interference with personal 
autonomy to such a degree that it is objectionable; the burden is 
incidental.140 To the extent that penalizing particular choices of 
                                                                                                     
 135. See Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at 
the Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 115 (2003) (stating 
that graduates from institutions of higher education “graduate to become 
citizens who shape business, education, the arts, and the law for the next 
generation”). 
 136. The Supreme Court recognized one form of this advantage provided by 
primary and secondary education in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222 (1982) 
(noting that “depriving the children of any disfavored group of an education, we 
foreclose the means by which that group might raise the level of esteem in 
which it is held by the majority”), but it is no less true of postsecondary 
education. 
 137. Id. at 221 (“‘[A]s . . . pointed out early in our history, . . . some degree of 
education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and 
intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and 
independence.’” (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972))). 
 138. And that may be self-fulfilling, as argued above. Supra notes 32–33 and 
accompanying text. 
 139. Separately, I have argued for expansion of federal student aid programs 
to reduce or eliminate the need for private student loans. Glater, supra note 58, 
at 58. The terms of private student loans, which are generally worse than those 
of federal loans, do turn on borrower characteristics. Id. 
 140. Professor Michael C. Dorf has questioned the whole notion of 
“incidental” infringements of rights. See generally Michael C. Dorf, Incidental 
Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175 (1996). Professor Dorf 
noted, however, “[f]rom the perspective of a rightholder, the severity of a law’s 
impact has no necessary connection to whether the law directly or incidentally 
burdens the right’s exercise.” Id. at 1177. Professor Dorf consequently argues 
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courses of study hurts anyone, and to the extent that student 
borrowers take note of interest rates at all,141 those deterred from 
pursuing particular courses of study will likely be students of 
limited financial means, and in the context of education, 
discrimination on the basis of wealth is not necessarily 
unconstitutional.142 However, both in the popular press143 and on 
university campuses,144 interest has increased in recent years in 
promotion of socioeconomic diversity,145 out of concern both about 
declining class mobility in the United States and about achieving 
greater racial and ethnic diversity without considering race or 
ethnicity in college admissions decisions. But pursuit of 
socioeconomic diversity in various fields becomes more difficult if 
wealth is unevenly distributed across the student population and 
access to credit is more costly for students who choose particular 
majors. If economic barriers to higher education matter—and 
they do—then any policy that would exacerbate the effects of 
                                                                                                     
that courts should apply heightened scrutiny to laws that incidentally hamper 
the exercise of fundamental rights. Id. at 1179. However, I do not concede that 
hampering a student’s freedom to choose a career by raising the cost of 
particular choices constitutes an “incidental” infringement. 
 141. Supra Part II. 
 142. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 23–24 
(1973) (“[If] the children in districts having relatively low assessable property 
values . . . [complain of] receiving a poorer quality education than . . . children in 
districts having more assessable wealth . . . a sufficient answer to [their] 
argument is that, at least where wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause 
does not require absolute equality . . . .”). 
 143. See, e.g., David Leonhardt, Rethinking Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 14, 2012, at SR4 (arguing that socioeconomic class should be a factor in 
college admissions decisions).  
 144. See, e.g., Matthew N. Gaertner & Melissa Hart, Considering Class: 
College Access and Diversity 35 (Univ. of Colo. Law Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 12-18, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/ 
SSRN_ID2256159_code509970.pdf?abstractid=2137126&mirid=1 (finding that 
use of class-based criteria in admissions could contribute to racial diversity in 
college admissions). For example, a study of the effects of shifting to 
emphasizing socioeconomic class, rather than race, in admissions decisions 
could enhance overall diversity along different axes. Id. at 5. 
 145. See, e.g., Leonhardt, supra note 143, at SR4 (“But simple discrimination 
seems to have become a relatively smaller obstacle over the last few decades, 
whole socioeconomic disadvantage has become a larger one.”). 
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those barriers should be greeted with considerable skepticism.146 
Public policy should promote access to education, not hinder it. 
C. Education Finance Policy Should Respect Student Autonomy 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that under the 
Constitution, decisions about education must receive special 
deference.147 Although the Court has determined that the 
constitution does not provide a fundamental right to 
education,148 the Justices have recognized that, like the 
decisions whether to marry or to have children, decisions about 
education “involve[ ] the most intimate and personal choices a 
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal 
dignity and autonomy, [and] are central to the liberty protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment.”149 In a case involving the right 
to terminate a pregnancy, the Court went on to explain the basis 
for the concern of the Fourteenth Amendment in powerful 
terms: “At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own 
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the 
mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not 
define the attributes of personhood were they formed under 
compulsion of the State.”150 What is at stake in choosing a 
course of study and subsequent career is freedom to pursue 
                                                                                                     
 146. If particular populations tend to major in specific subjects, see supra 
note 60 and accompanying text, members of those populations could be harmed 
more by higher interest rates applicable to loans to students in those majors. 
 147. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) 
(“Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to 
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and 
education.” (citation omitted)). 
 148. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (noting 
that publicly provided “[e]ducation, of course, is not among the rights afforded 
explicit protection under our Federal Constitution . . . [and] we [do not] find any 
basis for saying it is implicitly so protected”). However, a distinction can be 
drawn between government’s provision of education at all—the issue in 
Rodriguez—and a student’s choice of the sort of education to pursue. 
 149. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. While the case involved the right to terminate a 
pregnancy, the Court carefully placed the decision in the context of other 
protected rights. See id. at 915 (framing the issue in terms of the rights to 
privacy and bodily integrity). 
 150. Id. 
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happiness151 because education is a means to that end.152 
Students should be able to make their own choices.153 
                                                                                                     
 151.  While a student may state that earning potential is a major factor in 
choice of major, other factors may be, too. Professor Simkovic cites a study by 
Amanda Thorson, who studied earnings of graduates with different majors, for 
the point that “choice of field of study affects wages and employment,” Simkovic, 
supra note 1, at 539 (citing Amanda Thorson, The Effect of College Major on 
Wages, 13 PARK PLACE ECONOMIST 45 (2005)), and that study concluded that 
graduates in more specialized, technical majors, like engineering, earned more 
than those in more general majors, like communications. Amanda Thorson, The 
Effect of College Major on Wages, 13 PARK PLACE ECONOMIST 45, 54–56 (2005). 
But not all specialized majors were STEM fields. Id. at 55. Further, the Thorson 
study noted a tradeoff for students, because more specialized majors were less 
transferable and so less enabling of career changes. Id. at 56. That observation 
makes the value judgment that students should pursue the highest-earning jobs 
less certain: Students may rationally prefer to earn less but enjoy more 
flexibility. Another article cited by Professor Simkovic suggested that some 
students’ choices of major were part of a rational plan to improve the odds of 
gaining admission to graduate school. See Simkovic, supra note 1, at 582 n.133 
(citing Eric Eide & Geetha Waehrer, The Role of the Option Value of College 
Attendance in College Major Choice, 17 ECON. EDUC. REV. 73, 74 (1998)). 
Whether students are choosing to preserve flexibility or to pursue graduate 
education, it is unclear why their choice of major should be penalized. This claim 
is bolstered by the argument that individual students know their strengths and 
should not be penalized for choosing courses of study that play to those 
strengths. See Morton Paglin & Anthony M. Rufolo, Heterogeneous Human 
Capital, Occupational Choice, and Male-Female Earnings Differences, 8 J. LAB. 
& ECON. 123, 126 (1990) (discussing how, given different ability endowments, 
students “may be better off choosing to produce a type of human capital that has 
less value per unit because the student could produce more units in a given 
amount of time”). Professor Simkovic cites this study, Simkovic, supra note 1, at 
571–72 n.117, but does not take into account its implications for student 
autonomy. 
 152. Professor Simkovic argues that the current regime of fixed interest 
rates on student loans force students majoring in certain fields, those that 
produce graduates less likely to default on their loans, to subsidize the loans 
made to students majoring in fields producing graduates with higher odds of 
default. Simkovic, supra note 1, at 590. This is either a normative argument, 
that it is unfair that the interest rate students in the former group must pay is 
higher than they should have to, or it is an argument about efficiency. Because 
the interest rate historically has been set by Congress and has had no 
relationship to riskiness of the loan, id. at 560, the logical argument rests on 
inefficiency: too many students pursue high-risk majors because the cost is 
artificially low, and too few students pursue low-risk majors because the cost is 
artificially high. If, however, interest rates do not play a role in student choice of 
major, as I have argued above (and Professor Simkovic concedes that the 
evidence is “somewhat mixed,” id. at 629 n.281), then this asserted cross-
subsidy does not cause students to pursue the wrong courses of study. 
 153. Even if institutions were to adopt testing to determine aptitudes, tests 
could not capture the student’s level of interest, and interest in a field motivates 
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V. Conclusion 
Valid criticisms have been launched at higher education 
finance; the system that we have is profoundly unsatisfying. 
Students graduate saddled with debt that burdens borrowers and 
constrains their career choices. Loan terms do not create 
incentives for academic performance. Low salaries in certain 
fields have prompted government intervention to assist in loan 
repayment. In other words, serious issues remain outstanding. 
Professor Simkovic has made an invaluable contribution to our 
ongoing national debate about how we, collectively and 
individually, should pay for college. But his proposal to vary 
interest rates based on choice of major does not address the core 
problems we face and would make some borrowers worse off than 
they are under the current regime. 
Professor Simkovic and others have advocated that interest 
rates on federal student loans should be higher for those who 
choose courses of study associated with lower wages and higher 
rates of unemployment.154 Correspondingly, he has suggested 
that interest rates should be lower for those students who choose 
more lucrative paths.155 In this Article, I have argued that the 
underlying premise of his argument—that students are 
graduating having completed educational programs that do not 
enable them to obtain jobs that pay higher salaries—may be 
incorrect, and that student choices resulting in earning particular 
wages may not be evidence of a problem requiring government 
intervention. I have challenged the feasibility and the efficacy of 
                                                                                                     
effort and achievement. At a less practical level, there is value in enabling a 
student to study what that student wants to study and do what that student 
wants to do. Studies of human happiness suggest that, not surprisingly, those 
who feel that they control their destiny are happier, Florida, Mellander & 
Rentfrow, supra note 130, at 623. However, there are those who argue that 
happiness is not in itself a worthy goal. See, e.g., Jim Holt, Against Happiness, 
N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 20, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/20/magazine/ 
20WWLN.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2013) (noting the discrepancy across 
cultures between happiness and social progress, freedom, education, and low 
suicide rates) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 154. See Simkovic, supra note 1, at 625–26 (noting that a risk-based pricing 
system would make borrowers internalize the risk associated with their choice 
of major). 
 155. See id. at 589–90 (stating that this risk internalization will encourage 
students to choose majors that will lead them to “high-value occupations”). 
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the proposal, warned of the adverse effects on particular 
borrowers, and suggested that the proposal is inconsistent with 
our collective beliefs about the significance and role of higher 
education in society. Government should not infringe upon 
students’ freedom to choose a way in the world.  
